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Abstract
In this paper, we analyze the security of an RFID authentication protocol
proposed by Liu and Bailey [1], called Privacy and Authentication Protocol
(PAP), and show its vulnerabilities and faulty assumptions. PAP is a pri-
vacy and authentication protocol designed for passive tags. The authors
claim that the protocol, being resistant to commonly assumed attacks, re-
quires little computation and provides privacy protection and authentication.
Nevertheless, we propose two traceability attacks and an impersonation at-
tack, in which the revealing of secret information (i.e., secret key and static
identifier) shared between the tag and the reader is unnecessary. Moreover,
we review all basic assumptions on which the design of the protocol resides,
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and show how many of them are incorrect and are contrary to the common
assumptions in RFID systems.
Keywords: RFID, authentication, privacy, cryptanalysis, impersonation
attack, tractability attack
1. Introduction
Numerous RFID protocols have been proposed with the goal of provid-
ing secure contact between readers and tags over the open radio channel.
Nevertheless, tags have severe limitations in terms of circuitry (gate equiv-
alents), storage, and power consumption; thus, designing an efficient and
secure mutual authentication protocol is still a great challenge. There are
many security risks linked to RFID technology, and of these, privacy and
tracking are the most important. We will explain these in detail. Neverthe-
less, readers are urged to consult [2, 3, 4, 5] to have a complete overview of
the risks and threats linked to RFID technology.
Privacy: Tag content, which may include sensitive information, is revealed
when insecure tags are interrogated by readers. Tags and readers should
thus be authenticated to overcome this problem. However, readers are
frequently not authenticated, and tags usually answer in a completely
transparent and indiscriminate way.
Tracking: A problem closely related to privacy is tracking or violations of
location privacy. Even if access of tag content were only allowed to
authorized readers, non-tracking might still not be guaranteed. The
answer provided by tags is usually a constant value (i.e., a static iden-
tifier). Under this assumption, an attacker will be able to establish an
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association between tags and their owners. Additionally, we can relax
our conditions and assume that tags only contain product codes rather
than unique identifiers. Nevertheless, Weis et al. claimed that tracking
is still be possible by using a constellation of tags [2].
Privacy and authentication protocol (PAP), like many proposed protocols
[6, 7, 8, 9], can be categorized under the class of a simple mutual authenti-
cation protocol [10], in which tags can generate a random number and have
computation recourses to compute a hash function. However, unlike other
protocols in the area of simple mutual authentication protocol, PAP is de-
signed in four sub-protocols based on the specific location of the tag.
For the rest of this paper, we first present a full review of PAP and
illustrate the functionality of the four proposed sub-protocols. Then, we
introduce and discuss the vulnerability analysis of the protocol and its as-
sumptions categorized under conceptual and operational view, respectively.
Thereafter, we propose two traceability attacks, followed by an imperson-
ation attack. Finally, we offer some conclusions.
2. Review of PAP
PAP claims to have a protocol, which is compliant with the Electronic
Product Code Class-1 Generation-2 (EPC-C1G2) standard [11] or ISO/IEC
18006-C [12] equivalently, in which the entities involved consist of tags, read-
ers, and a back-end database. The basic communication of the protocol
is between tags and readers, and the authors do not discuss the matter of
reader-database communication. Furthermore, compared with the original
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EPC-C1G2 standard, it is assumed that RFID tags support on-chip, a se-
cure hash function, to provide stronger security guarantees.
Each tag in PAP has a secret key k shared with the reader, a generic
name (i.e., product type), a static ID (i.e., unique identifier), and a privacy
bit that can be switched between 0 and 1 (the 0/1 value denotes that the tag
is in a secure/insecure location). Readers are classified into three categories,
namely, inventory, checkout, and return readers. The implementation sce-
nario considers four locations for the tag to be in: 1) inside the store; 2) at
the checkout counter; 3) outside the store; and 4) at the return counter. Each
location has its own sub-protocol in PAP in terms of maintaining privacy and
authentication for the tags all the time and at any location.
The basic difference among the four PAP sub-protocols is that the pri-
vacy bit value is equal to zero, as in the cases of in-store and checkout sub-
protocols. Here, the tag is assumed to be inside the store and sends its
ID during communication with the reader. Otherwise, the generic name,
which is a numeric representation of the product type, communicates with
the reader when the privacy bit value is set to 1 as in the cases of the out-store
and return sub-protocols.
The in-store and out-store sub-protocols both share the same exchanged
messages. Basically, tags send back one message after being queried by a
reader. However, the exception for the message is that the tag sends a static
identifier ID in the former and the tag sends a generic name in the latter. In
both cases, a random number is sent in the tag response, but this does not
have any security purpose. The in-store sub-protocol does not offer authen-
tication or privacy protection because its main goal is efficiency. It assumes
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that the store provides other mechanisms to prevent malicious readers from
entering. In the out-store sub-protocol, privacy protection is achieved by
sending a generic name number, not the ID, where an unauthorized reader
can read a tag but will not know what specific item is being read at that
time.
The checkout sub-protocol and the return sub-protocol are sequels to the
in-store and out-store sub-protocols, respectively; they also differ in terms
of dealing with the ID of the former and in the generic name of the latter.
These protocols share the same exchanged messages to establish mutual au-
thentication between the tag and the reader. The first two messages (i.e.,
those that are used in the in-store and out-store sub-protocols) are iden-
tical. Next, the reader retrieves the secret key k from the database using
the ID or the generic name received from the tag. The reader computes a
one-way hash function on k and the random number nt received from the
tag (H1 = hash(nt, k)). It then computes a new nonce nr and sends both
values (H1, nr) to the tag. The tag checks the hash value received. If so, it
authenticates the reader and switches the privacy bit from 0 to 1. Finally,
the tag computes H2 = hash(nr, k) and forwards this value to the reader.
Upon checking its correctness, the reader authenticates the tag. Figure (1)
illustrates these four sub-protocols.
3. Vulnerability Analysis of PAP
The PAP threat model presents several assumptions that are considered
essential for the protocol to ensure the privacy and authentication guarantees
that it offers when applied in real-life scenarios. The authors partially justi-
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fied these assumptions based on previous works, but they failed to mention
these references. Furthermore, many of these assumptions are not compli-
ant with the standard (EPC-C1G2 or ISO/IEC 18006-C) that the proposed
protocol claims to be compatible with. For example, Chien [10] categorized
RFID mutual authentication protocols into four classes, namely, full-fledged,
simple, lightweight, and ultra lightweight. EPC-C1G2-friendly protocols sup-
port only the last two categories when PAP uses a hash function and a ran-
dom number generator that are supported by the first two categories only.
The criticisms of these assumptions are summarized in two views: 1)
conceptual view (to analyze the design incompatibilities) and 2) operation
view (to examine inaccuracies within the implementation assumptions). We
explain these views below.
Conceptual view: PAP aims to provide authentication and privacy for the
tag when it resides inside or outside the store using the privacy bit.
More precisely, the authors ensure these by not sending the tag’s ID
outside the store. When the realization of the privacy bit is techni-
cally straightforward, its activeness against rouge readers is question-
able [22, 23]. PAP categorizes readers into three types, namely, in-
ventory, checkout, and return readers. An inventory reader is capable
of querying a tag, but is not connected to a database. Nevertheless,
this assumption is mistaken because these readers will not be able to
authenticate (legitimate or dishonest) tags and, therefore, counterfeit
tags are never detected. This is claimed to be the only difference be-
tween the inventory reader and the other two discriminated readers.
In fact, the other two readers have the same capabilities, but have dif-
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ferent label names. On the other hand, PAP is disseminated into four
sub-protocols. This dissemination is unnecessary when there is one
protocol with different states. In-store and out-store sub-protocols are
no more than the first part of the protocol. The return sub-protocol is
a special case of the original checkout sub-protocol when the privacy
bit value is equal to one and, accordingly, tags send a numerical generic
name instead of the tag’s ID. Finally, PAP aims to lessen the cost of
the tags by sending the random value nt once at the beginning of every
sub-protocol so that the tag would not need further programming for
each sub-protocol. Although this might be true when using the four
sub-protocols of PAP, it does not, however, reduce the initial cost of the
tag. More precisely, it also does not justify the relatively high cost of
implementing on-chip of low-cost tags a secure hash function [13, 14].
Operation view: Given that PAP was designed for RFID tags, capable
of computing a secure hash function, PAP cannot be implemented on
EPC-C1G2 tags, as claimed by the authors. Specifically, EPC-C1G2
low-cost tags do not support hash functions; it only supports simple op-
erations, a 16-bit cyclic redundancy check, and a 16-bit pseudorandom
number generator. Furthermore, the authors state that the short-range
transmission between a reader and a tag provides a secure channel be-
cause an adversary cannot get in-between. This assumption is contrary
to most studies on the security of channels, where it is commonly as-
sumed that an adversary is capable of eavesdropping on the forward
(reader-to-tag) and backward (tag-to-reader) channels [15, 16]. The
authors misconstrue this assumption based on studies implemented on
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different types of tags, and mostly on different application areas or
models than the ones proposed in the paper (e.g., place-on readers
where the distance between the tagged object, such as contactless ID
cards, and the reader allows no such space for malicious readers to be
placed in the middle). Nevertheless, in the applications referred to in
PAP, the nature of the objects holding the tags and real-life implemen-
tation scenarios cannot support this assumption. As such, the protocol
presumes that the store ensures extra security measures to prevent any
reader from getting inside the store, and that is unacceptable for public-
related applications (e.g., Wal-Mart). It is also unrealistic to exclude
eavesdropping attacks for the same reason, because an adversary could
be outside the store and still be able to eavesdrop on a tag inside the
store when the privacy bit value is zero. To the best of our knowledge,
there are no proper ways to detect or prevent malicious readers from
getting inside the store (remember, we are using non-secure and pub-
lic radio channel). Furthermore, PAP claims that real-time message
compromising (i.e., interception/alteration) is difficult and is therefore
discarded. However, numerous studies [17, 18, 19, 20] considered it an
effective threat in many applications, giving it an important role in
protocol design.
3.1. Tractability Attacks
One of the main concerns linked to privacy is the location-privacy or
tractability protection, which indicates that unauthorized readers are unable
to identify the location of the tag (or the tag’s holder) by tracing the tag’s
transmitted data. PAP uses strong cryptographic primitives on the tag,
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such as a pseudorandom number generator and a hash function, that are
considered relatively costly (especially the latter) in terms of gate equivalents
(circuit area), and whose support increases significantly in the final cost of the
chip. The use of these primitives should offer a highly non-traceable protocol.
Nevertheless, PAP does not fully utilize the computing capabilities that are
supported on-chip of the tag and prefers efficiency over security in some of its
sub-protocols (i.e., in-store and out-store sub-protocols). The check-out and
return sub-protocols are designed weakly and are vulnerable to traceability
attacks despite using random numbers and computing authentication tokens
by running a hash function. The traceability deficiencies are described in the
sections below.
1. In the in-store and out-store protocols, the tag always sends fixed values
corresponding to the tag’s ID and tag names, respectively. In the
former, the tag’s holder can be tracked because the ID is unique and
constant. In the latter, tag name is constant but not a unique value.
Nevertheless, the tag’s holder can be tracked using constellations of
tag names that are unequivocally linked to a specific user. The use of
the random numbers, nt, avoids further programming in the different
sub-protocols. However, in these sub-protocols, the nt value is not
used for any security purpose. Furthermore, the security of these sub-
protocols depends solely on the cover-coding protection mechanism,
which is considered completely ineffective and insecure [21] compared
with the use of the hash function – specially when the hash function
is used properly. More precisely, the use of a cover-coding mechanism
does not protect the values transmitted by the tag (i.e., ID or tag
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name). In fact, the tag is insecure and is traceable if an attacker can
eavesdrop on the forward or backward channels, which is the most
common assumption in RFID systems.
2. In the check-out and return sub-protocols, the adversary can track the
tag by setting one of the random numbers used in the protocol (i.e.
nt or nr) to a constant value “c”. There are two alternatives; we can
track either the reader’s answer or the tag’s answer. In a forward-
channel tractability attack, the adversary can intercept the tag’s reply
to the reader’s query. Then, he/she replaces nt with constant value
c, and finally forwards the message (ID/name, c) to the reader. The
rest of the protocol would conclude normally. We emphasize here that
the hashed value H1 is the same every time the attack is executed
because the adversary fixes nt to c (H1 = hash(c, k)). If the adversary
runs the attack twice, as illustrated in Figure (2), he/she is able to
track the tag by checking the equality between the H1 values. In the
backward-channel tractability attack, the reader receives the tag’s reply
on its query, hashes nt (H1 = hash(nt, k)), and sends the hashed value
accompanied by a new random number nr to the tag (H1, nr). The
adversary intercepts the message, replaces nr with a c constant and
forwards the message (H1, c) to the tag. The rest of the protocol would
conclude normally. As the adversary sets nr to c, the hashed value H2
is the same every time the attack is executed, and the adversary is able
to track the tag by checking the equality between H2 values. Figure 3
shows the two executions of the described attack.
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3.2. Impersonation Attacks
PAP claims that an adversary cannot impersonate a tag because the value
of the secret key k is never sent over the insecure radio channel and that the
adversary cannot compute the authentication tokens (H2 = hash(nr, k)).
However, an adversary can impersonate a tag using the answers provided
by a second legitimate reader. More precisely, the adversary exploits the
symmetry of the messages computed by the reader and the tag in the PAP.
In other words, the values of H1 = hash(nt, k) and H2 = hash(nr, k) have
the same structure. We describe the attack in detail below.
An impersonation attack can be conducted between an adversary and
two legitimate readers. The second reader generates the messages of the
supplanted tag. We assume that before launching the attack, the adversary
eavesdrops on the ID/name of its target tag. First, reader1 sends a request
query to the adversary. The adversary replies with {ID/name, nt}, where
nt represents an arbitrary random value. Then, reader1 computes its au-
thentication token H1, generates a random value nr, and sends both values
to the adversary. The adversary simulates that he/she received a request
from reader2 and sends the {ID/name, nr}. The adversary uses the random
number nr received from reader1. The reader2 computes its authentication
token (H∗
1
= hash(nr, k)) and sends it to the adversary. Finally, the adver-
sary forwards H∗
1
value to reader1. The reader1 checks the token received
and authenticates the adversary. So, impersonation is viable by forwarding
messages of a second legitimate reader and without disclosing the secret key
of the tag. The attack is illustrated in Figure 4.
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4. Conclusions
We introduced a vulnerability analysis of PAP for RFID tags. As shown
in the paper, the assumption that PAP is an EPC-C1G2-friendly protocol
is not well founded due to the excessive resources needed to support a hash
function on board. Therefore, the proposed protocol is not suitable for low-
cost RFID tags.
The paper first scrutinized the basis on which the protocol has been
founded and then showed how two of its main security objectives can be com-
promised. More precisely, the assumptions determining how PAP provides
a secure (privacy and authentication) RFID protocol have been discussed
and determined to be incorrectly assumed during the design of the protocol.
Then, we analyzed the protocol for traceability attacks, after which we illus-
trated respective attacks on the forward and backward channels. Finally, we
conducted an impersonation attack by forwarding the messages computed by
a second legitimate reader. In summary, protocol designers should check care-
fully a protocol’s compatibility with standards (e.g., EPC-C1G2 or ISO/IEC
18006-C). Moreover, the design of a secure and efficient RFID authentication
protocol remains to be a challenge and not a completely resolved issue.
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